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INSIGHTS INTO THE "AFFIRMANCE EFFECT" ON
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
CHRIS GUTHRIE*

& TRACEY E. GEORGE**

I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................
II. THE AFFIRMANCE EFFECT ...................................................................................
III. THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE AFFIRMANCE EFFECT ....................................
A. PoliticalScience Rational-ActorAccounts ...................................................
1. PoliticalBehavioralism and the Attitudinal Model .............................
2. New Institutionalismand the Strategic Model.....................................
B. Boundedly-Rational-Actor Account .............................................................
1. Heuristics-and-BiasesProgram.............................................................
(a) Status Quo B ias ...............................................................................
(b) Om ission B ias ..................................................................................
Program...................................................
2. Fast-and-Frugal-Heuristics
(a) Recognition Heuristic ......................................................................
(b) One-Reason H euristics ....................................................................
(c) Im itation ..........................................................................................
IV . C ON CLU SION ........................................................................................................

I.

357
359
363
364
364
369
374
376
377
379
380
382
383
384
385

INTRODUCTION

The judicial function is a vast human practice that can be usefully
examined from social, political, philosophical, economical, psychological and other theoretical paradigms. No single perspective is
capable of capturing judging comprehensively. . . . Thus, rather
than compete for theoretical dominance, scholars should be encouraged to pursue each and every avenue capable of enhancing
our understanding of the complex and vital practice of judicial decision making.'

* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University
Law School. B.A., Stanford University, 1989; Ed.M., Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1991; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1994.
** Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School; Ph.D. Student, Washington
University. B.A. & B.S., Southern Methodist University, 1989; J.D., Stanford Law School,
1992.
1. Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of JudicialDecision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J.
1, 32 (1998); see also Elinor Ostrom, Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the
InstitutionalAnalysis and Development Framework, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS
35 (Paul A. Sabatier ed., 1999).
Because regularized human behavior occurs within a wide diversity of ruleordered situations that share structural features . . . there is no single discipline that addresses all questions important for the study of human institutions. Understanding the kinds of strategies and heuristics that humans adopt
in diverse situations is enhanced by the study of anthropology, economics, game
theory, history, law, philosophy, political science, psychology, public administration, and sociology.
Id. at 38.
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Imagine a federal case on appeal about which you know nothingnot the parties, not the issue in dispute, not the court ruling below,
nothing. Suppose the case is being decided by the United States Supreme Court. If this is all you know about the case, what prediction
would you make about its outcome? Now suppose, instead, that the
case is being decided by a panel of circuit judges on the United States
Courts of Appeals. You do not know the particular judges on the
panel, nor do you even know the circuit where the case is being
heard. If all you know about the case is that a three-judge panel in
one of the circuits is hearing the case, what prediction would you
make about its outcome?
Even if you are only a casual observer of the federal courts, you
would probably predict that the Supreme Court would reverse but
that the court of appeals would affirm. More often than not, you
would be right. Reversals are a defining feature of the Supreme
Court: over the last decade, the Supreme Court reversed 64% of the
cases it heard. 2 Affirmances are a defining feature of the courts of
appeals: the courts of appeals affirmed 90% of the cases they decided
3
during the same period.
In a system in which the highest appellate court seldom affirms,
why do the lower appellate courts routinely do so? What, in other
words, accounts for this "affirmance effect ' 4 in the United States
Courts of Appeals? Consistent with Dan Simon's observation that appellate judging "can be usefully examined from social, political, philosophical, economical, psychological and other theoretical paradigms, '5 we use insights from multiple disciplines in this Article to explore why the courts of appeals so often affirm and so seldom reverse.
We begin in Part II by offering a statistical overview of the affirmance
effect. In Part III, we use political science to develop two theoretical
explanations (a sincere-rational-actor account and a strategic-rationalactor account) for this phenomenon and psychology and behavioral
economics to develop a third explanation (a bounded-rationality account). We conclude that each of these accounts sheds some light on
this question, but none of them is capable of providing a definitive answer. We thus echo Simon's sentiment that "scholars should be en-

2.

See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS,

AND DEVELOPMENTS 228-29 tbl.3-6 (3d ed. 2003) (reporting disposition for 1994 through
2001 Terms); Thomas C. Goldstein, Statistics for the Supreme Court's October Term 2002,
72 U.S.L.W. 3078, 3078 (July 15, 2003) [hereinafter Goldstein, 2002 Term Statistics]; Thomas C. Goldstein, Statisticsfor the Supreme Court's October Term 2003, 73 U.S.L.W. 3045,
3046 (July 31, 2004) [hereinafter Goldstein, 2003 Term Statistics].
3. The courts of appeals data in this paper are drawn primarily from the Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
4. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 150 (2002) (using the term "affirmance effect").
5. Simon, supra note 1, at 32.
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couraged to pursue each and every avenue capable of enhancing our
understanding' '6 of why appellate judges do what they do.

II. THE AFFIRMANCE EFFECT
The American federal judicial system has thirteen intermediate appellate courts7 staffed by 179 active judges 8 and one court of last resort with
nine Justices. 9 The courts of appeals handle the lion's share of the system's appellate work; last year, for instance, they reviewed more than
27,000 trial court decisions in the twelve general jurisdictions (circuits
numbered one through eleven plus D.C.) and one specialized jurisdiction
(the Federal Circuit).10 By contrast, the Supreme Court granted review to
fewer than eighty out of the thousands of requests presented in the October 2003 Term.1 1 But, if your writ is granted by the Court, then you are
almost assured of a victory: the Justices affirmed only twenty-two of the
eighty cases they heard, or a mere 28%.12 By contrast, the circuit courts
affirmed nearly 91% of the 27,000-plus rulings reviewed during the same
time. 13 Figures la and 2 show the affirmance rates and caseloads for the
courts of appeals and Supreme Court respectively.
FIGURE 1A
CIRCUIT COURT CASELOAD AND AFFIRMANCE RATES: 1946-2003
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6. Id.
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000).
8. See id. § 44.
9. See id. § 1.
10. See 2003 Din. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 34 tbl.S-1 [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2OO3/tables/sl.pdf (last visited Oct.
14, 2004).

11. Goldstein, 2003 Term Statistics, supra note 2, at 3046.
12. Id.
13. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 27 tbl.B-5, 34 tbl.S-1 (presenting data for the
October 2002 Term), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/contents.html (last
visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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FIGURE 2
SUPREME COURT CASELOAD AND
AFFIRMANCE RATES: 1946-2003 TERMS
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The Supreme Court's affirmance rate remained fairly steady during the last half-century, dipping below 50% only four times since the
1946 Term, as reflected in Figure 2. The circuit rate, by contrast, has
seen a steady rise over the last half-century, from 72% in 1945 to
82% in 1975 to nearly 91% in 2003. Figure 3 combines both rates on
a single graph to highlight the difference.
FIGURE 3
AFFIRMANCE RATES: SUPREME COURT AND CIRCUIT COURTS
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The courts of appeals' treatment of lower court decisions reveals
interesting characteristics when subjected to closer scrutiny. First,
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the circuit affirmance rate appears to rise with caseload, as can be
seen in Figure lb (in which the vertical axes from Figure la have
been adjusted to the minimum and maximum values of each variable). Indeed, the rate of affirmances is strongly and positively associated with the number of cases: the Pearson correlation, a statistical
measure of association, is .95 (on an absolute scale of 0 to

1).

14

Thus,

a 9500-case increase in caseload corresponds to about a 6% increase
in affirmance rate. 15 If this relationship sounds unimpressive, keep in
mind that the circuit docket has increased tremendously (more than
tenfold from 1946 to present) while the affirmance rate moves more
slowly (the proportion of affirmed cases has not even doubled). These
two phenomena may be related in any number of ways: one may be a
cause of the other or both may be the product of other forces. These
simple statistics only give us an initial sense of some possible relationship.
FIGURE 1B
ADJUSTED GRAPHS: 1946-2003
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The circuit affirmance rate also appears related to whether the
ruling is published.16 Historically, practically all circuit opinions were
printed in the Federal Reporter. 7 But, beginning in the 1960s and
14. This is the Pearson correlation, chosen because it is a standardized measure and
thus is not dependent on the units of measurement. Caseload is measured in individual
cases while affirmance rate is measured in percentage points.
15. That is, a one standard deviation increase in caseload is associated with a .95
standard deviation increase in reversal rate.
16. Cf. Keith H. Beyler, Selective Publication Rules: An Empirical Study, 21 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 1, 31 (1989) (reporting the same finding for Illinois state appellate courts).
17. In 1964, the United States Judicial Conference recommended that courts of appeals publish "only those opinions which are of general precedential value." 1964 DIR.
ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 11, reprinted in 1962-1964 REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
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picking up speed after 1973, circuit courts began to issue some opinions without publishing them. 8 The number of unpublished opinions
has increased every year since. 19 We set forth below the affirmance
rate in published opinions for three time periods from 1946 to 1988,
as calculated by Songer, Sheehan, and Haire using the U.S. Courts of
Appeals Data Base sample. 20 We are unaware of any available data
on affirmance rate in unpublished opinions; however, we can infer
that it is much higher by comparing the rate in published opinions to
the rate in all merits decisions. When publication remained common
practice (1946-1960), the two rates are essentially the same. 21 But
the rates diverge as fewer opinions are published.
TABLE 1
RATE OF AFFIRMANCE IN PUBLISHED OPINIONS COMPARED TO ALL
MERITS DECISIONS

1946-60

735%o

74.6%

1961-69

74.3%

77.5%

1970-88

69.2%

83.0%

Finally, the courts of appeals have consistently been less receptive
to criminal appellants than to civil ones. This is perhaps not surprising: the relative cost of appeal is lower for convicted defendants than
for losing civil parties. Every year since 1946, the affirmance rate for
criminal appeals has been higher than for civil appeals, ranging from
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES. Prior to that time, the Federal Reporter contained every opinion.
18. In 1973, the United States Judicial Conference directed the circuits to develop local rules for selective publication. COMM. ON USE OF APPELLATE ENERGIES, ADVISORY
COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS 3
(1973).
19. See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573,
587 tbl.2 (1981) (finding a 38.3% publication rate for decisions in 1979); see also Martha J.
Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining
Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 757, 761-62 (1995).
20.

See DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES

COURTS OF APPEALS 105 tbl.5.1 (2000).
21. The difference may be the product of a small number of unpublished opinions or,
more likely, of error-the standard error in the Songer sample or the clerk reporting error
in the population number, or both.
22. The published opinion number is based on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Data Base
sample. See SONGER ET AL., supra note 20, at 105 tbl.5.1 (reporting reversal rate in a sample of published opinions).
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roughly 87% to 99%.23 The proportion of criminal cases on the circuits' docket has varied over time, experiencing an extended spike
following key defendant's rights rulings by the Warren Court. But
the affirmance rate is only weakly positively correlated with the relative number of criminal cases on the docket. As with caseload and
publication, the fact that a case is criminal gives us some information
about whether it is likely to be affirmed. That said, the fact remains
that the circuit affirmance rate is high even for civil cases, published
cases, and in years with shrinking caseloads.
III.

THEORETICAL AcCOuNTS OF THE AFFIRMANCE EFFECT

The high affirmance rate on the U.S. Courts of Appeals is puzzling. The dominant model of litigation behavior-the "selection
model"24-- only adds to the puzzle. Analyzing litigants rather than
judges, 25 George Priest and Benjamin Klein posit that litigants (in
the civil justice system anyway) are rational actors seeking to maximize their outcomes. 26 When deciding whether to go forward with adjudication or to settle a dispute, litigants compare the expected value
of adjudication to the actual value of settlement. Most cases will settle (even on appeal) because litigants can generally save money by
doing so. The cases that fail to settle are those in which the litigants
develop "divergent expectations" about the likely outcome in court,
and this ig most likely to occur in close cases where the court could
come out either way. Because there is no reason to expect close cases
to favor one side or the other, selection theory suggests that the affirmance rate in the courts of appeals should be about 50%. Kevin
Clermont and Ted Eisenberg explain the logic of this account as follows:
The usual brand of case-selection theory says that appeals should
act like trials. Appeals that clearly favor either the appellant or
the appellee would tend to be settled readily, because both sides
could save costs by so acting in light of their knowledge of all aspects of the case. Difficult appeals falling close to the applicable
decisional criterion would tend not to settle, because the parties

23.

For affirmance rates from 1946 to 1984, refer to Table B-1 of each Annual Report

of the Directorof the Administrative Office of the United States Courts released in that period. See source cited supra note 17. For affirmance rates from 1985 to 2003, refer to Table

B-5 of each Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts released in that period. See source cited supra note 17. The annual reports from
1997 to 2003 are also available on the World Wide Web at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbususc.judbus.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
24. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
25. Frank Cross refers to selection theory and others of its type as "litigant-driven"
theories of decisionmaking. Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1490-91 (2003).
26. Priest & Klein, supra note 24, at 4.
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would be more likely to disagree substantially with respect to their
predicted outcomes. These unsettled, difficult appeals entailing divergent expectations would fall more or less equally on either side
of the decisional criterion, regardless of both the position of that
criterion and the underlying distribution of cases. Case selection,
then, should leave for appellate adjudication a residue of appeals
exhibiting some nonextreme affirmance rate. Indeed, under simplifying assumptions, and as a limiting implication, case-selection
theorizing would even predict a 50% affirmance rate.27
The affirmance rate in the courts of appeals, even for civil cases
alone, is significantly higher than 50%,28 so selection theory sheds little light on it. Perhaps political science and psychology will be more
illuminating.
A.

PoliticalScience Rational-Actor Accounts

Political scientists who study law and courts do not adhere to a
single theory of judicial decisionmaking, but most adopt a (quasi) rational-actor paradigm that is the building block of modern political
science. Positive political theorist William Riker explains that the
two essential characteristics of the rational-choice model are: "1. Actors are able to order their alternative goals, values, tastes and
strategies. This means that the relation of preference and indifference among the alternatives is transitive .... 2. Actors choose from
available alternatives so as to maximize their satisfaction. '29 Some
scholars believe the judge can best be understood as a sincere rational actor (the "attitudinal" model), but others contend the judge is
better described as a sophisticated rational actor ("strategic" theory).
We offer in the next two subsections a preliminary assessment of
how each model might explain the relatively high affirmance rate on
the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
1.

PoliticalBehavioralism and the Attitudinal Model

The dominant political science model of judicial behavior is the attitudinal model, which builds on the early work of Hermann Pritch-

27. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 150-51 (footnote omitted).
28. See id. at 150 (reporting an affirmance rate in federal civil cases of about 80%); see
also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-PlaintiffBias in the FederalAppellate
Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128 (2000) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Anti-PlaintiffBias];
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobiain the Appellate Courts: Civil

Rights Really Do Differ from NegotiableInstruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 947.
29. William H. Riker, Political Science and Rational Choice, in PERSPECTIVES ON
POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 163, 172 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990).
Riker is considered by many to be the father of positive political theory. See generally
WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULIsM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982).

2005]
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ett 30 and Glendon Schubert.3 1 Pritchett and Schubert transformed the
study of judicial politics by focusing on individual voting behavior.
The attitudinal model has evolved from a psychology-based perspective 32 to a rational-choice one.3 3 The modern attitudinal model posits

that judges are goal-oriented actors who, when making decisions,
seek to maximize their sincere policy preferences or attitudes. The
model generally assumes that the content of judicial opinions is not
an accurate measure of judicial attitudes because judges have incentives to veil their true goals or because they are unaware of the underlying causes of their actions, or both.3 4 Attitudinal studies have
adopted various measures of attitudes, drawing on judicial backappointing President,
ground and experience, political party of the
35
decisions.
prior
and
evaluations,
newspaper

30. See generally C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN
JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-1947 (1948). Pritchett used simple statistics to
evaluate systematically microlevel voting behavior on the Court between 1937 and 1947.
For example, he identified distinct liberal and conservative voting blocs through agreement
scores (which reflect the percentage rate at which a given Justice votes with another Justice) and revealed ideological preferences by counting votes on particular issues. Pritchett
did not present an explanatory model of Supreme Court decisionmaking, but he did provide the basis for the development of the behavioral study of the Supreme Court.
31. See generally GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND
IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1946-1963 (1965) (drawing on the work of social
psychologists, Schubert was the first to propose a model of judicial decisionmaking based
on Justices' attitudes). Stuart Nagel and John Sprague also wrote groundbreaking work on
the subject shortly after the publication of The Judicial Mind. See generally STUART S.
NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE (1969); JOHN D. SPRAGUE,
VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1968).
32. See generally DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION
MAKING (1976) (expanding on Schubert's model with a construct of attitudes built on the
work of psychologist Milton Rokeach).
33. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (presenting the best statement and defense of attitudinal
theory); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
AITITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
34. Attitudinal scholars have considered the role of legal doctrine as a limiting or
guiding force in decisionmaking. See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature
of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1992); Jeffrey A. Segal,
Predicting Supreme Court Cases Probabilistically:The Search and Seizure Cases, 19621981, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 891 (1984).
35. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-1964, 60 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 374 (1966); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on
the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491 (1975) (using a
variety of social background variables including age, gender, race, prior employment, religion, and political party to explain circuit judges' votes); Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M.
Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002) (estimating ideal points for the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court using voting data); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover,
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557
(1989) (measuring judicial ideology based on the content of editorials written about a Supreme Court candidate after presidential nomination and before Senate confirmation); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995) (expanding the Segal and Cover scores to include Bush, Roose-
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Appellate judges who seek single-mindedly to make decisions
consistent with their policy preferences would vote to affirm every
lower court ruling with which they agree. This forecast seems inconsistent with the observed difference in the affirmance rates between the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals unless circuit
judges and district judges are much more likely to concur than Supreme Court Justices and circuit judges. If that is true, then Supreme Court Justices must disagree nearly as frequently with district judges as they do with circuit judges since the two sets of lower
court judges are in apparent accord. However, there is some evidence that the Supreme Court is more likely to reverse a circuit
36
court that has reversed a district court.
This simplistic attitudinal account seems insufficient. We can
build a better attitudinal explanation, however, by considering each
institution's discretion over its caseload. An attitudinal account
would explain the Supreme Court's low affirmance rate by focusing
on the Court's agenda-setting power: the Justices enjoy discretionary jurisdiction and thus choose almost all of the cases they hear
(except for the small number of original disputes). The Court is
more likely to grant certiorari to review lower court decisions that
are ideologically inconsistent with the Court's current majority because the Supreme Court acts ideologically, and thus it is more
likely to grant certiorari to reverse than to affirm the lower court.3 7
That is, the attitudinal model predicts that ideologically conscious
Justices grant review and then reverse divergent opinions from the
lower courts.

velt, and Truman appointees); C. Neal Tate, PersonalAttribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355 (1981) (finding that judicial background and
appointing President's ideology explained Justices' decisions in civil liberties, civil rights,
and economic liberties cases).
36. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda
Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988).
37. See, e.g., Virginia C. Armstrong & Charles A. Johnson, CertiorariDecisions by the
Warren & Burger Courts: Is Cue Theory Time Bound?, 15 POLITY 141, 149 (1982) (finding
that the Burger Court was more likely to grant certiorari to liberal appeals from court rulings in civil liberties and economic liberties cases, and the Warren Court was more likely
to grant certiorari in conservative economic liberties cases, but not in conservative civil liberties disputes); Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J.
POL. 824, 833 (1995) (examining certiorari and merits votes of Vinson Court Justices from
1946 through 1952 and finding that Justices who voted to reverse a lower court decision
were significantly more likely to have voted for certiorari than Justices who voted to affirm); Saul Brenner & John F. Krol, Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States
Supreme Court, 51 J. POL. 828, 832-33 (1989) (concluding, based on a sample of cases from
selected terms of the Vinson, Warren, and Burger Courts, that Justices who voted in favor
of certiorari were more likely to vote to reverse than Justices who opposed certiorari, and
terming such voting behavior an "error correcting strategy").
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The Court's recent reduction in its caseload may reflect, in part,
the grant-to-reverse effect: the conservative Rehnquist Court majority has found it less necessary to review (and reverse) relatively more
conservative decisions by the courts of appeals. 38 Republican Presidents have appointed a majority of sitting Justices: seven of the nine
Justices in the current Natural Court, that is, a period without any
turnover (1994 to present). And, during most of this period, Republi39
can appointees outnumbered Democratic appointees on the circuits.
Thus, the Court continues to reverse more cases than it affirms, but
it hears fewer cases because it is so closely ideologically aligned with
the circuit courts.

40

The courts of appeals' lack of agenda control, coupled with the
ideological alignment of upper and lower court judges, may also explain the circuits' high affirmance rate. In the federal system, the
courts of appeals have mandatory jurisdiction over appeals from district courts; thus, they must decide all cases properly brought to
them. An attitudinal explanation for the high affirmance rate would
be shared policy preferences between circuit and district judges. A
quick way to analyze this would be to consider the proportion of circuit and district court judges who are Republican appointees. As reflected in the table below, the ratio of Republican to Democratic appointees on the courts of appeals is similar to that on the district
courts. And, indeed, we would expect this to be true over time, as the
sitting President appoints judges to the courts at similar rates.
38. Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 557-61 (1998) (reviewing LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998)).
39. See Sheldon Goldman, JudicialSelection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination,
78 JUDICATURE 276, 291 tbl.6 (1995) (reporting composition by appointing President on
January 1, 1995); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary:
Many Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254, 272 tbl.8 (1997) (reporting composition by appointing President on January 1, 1997); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's Second Term Judiciary: PickingJudges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 264, 283 tbl.8 (1999) (reporting composition by appointing President on January 1, 1999); Sheldon Goldman et al.,
Clinton's Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84 JUDCATURE 228, 253 tbl.8 (2001) (reporting
the composition by appointing President on January 1, 2001, which is the only year covered in these biannual reports when Democratic appointees held an edge-though only a
slight one-over Republican appointees); Sheldon Goldman et al., W Bush Remaking the
Judiciary:Like Father like Son?, 86 JUDICATURE 282, 298 tbl.1 (2003) (reporting composition by appointing President on January 1, 2003). For data reflecting earlier periods, see
SONGER ET AL., supra note 20, at 31 tbl.2.1. For data on court composition by party of appointing President, see INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, THE
NOMINATION PROCESS: THE COURTS, at http://www.independentjudiciary.org/courts/ (last
visited Oct. 10, 2004) (listing current composition by circuit).
40. The Rehnquist Court's affirmance rate has been higher, on average, than the two
prior Courts. Only in the last three Terms has the Court's affirmance rate dropped to the
Warren era lows. This may also reflect the level of accord between the higher and lower
appellate courts. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Rehnquist Court Disposition of
Lower Court Decisions: Affirmation Not Reversal, 74 JUDICATURE 84, 86 (1990) (observing
that initially the Rehnquist Court affirmed a higher proportion of cases than the Warren
and Burger Courts and examining possible explanations).
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TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT COMPOSITION, 200341

65

84

56.4%

310

341

52.4%

We can consider the relationship between affirmance rate and court
composition by looking at circuits separately. Some circuits are much
more likely to reverse than others: The Second Circuit disagreed with district courts in about 1% of its cases last term, whereas the D.C. Circuit
differed with districts courts in nearly 15% of cases. Likewise, the composition of circuits varies: Republican Presidents appointed 80% of active
Eighth Circuit judges, but only 35% of Ninth Circuit judges. If our attitudinal hypothesis is correct, we would expect a statistical relationship between relative court composition (district as compared to circuit) and the
reversal rate for the twelve general jurisdiction circuits.
Figure 4 presents circuit reversal rates and the relative ideology of
the courts (as measured by party of appointing President). A quick
look at the graphs would seem to reveal a relationship between a circuit's likelihood of disagreeing with district judges and the difference
between the circuit and district courts' composition.
FIGURE 4
RELATIVE COURT COMPOSITION VERSUS REVERSAL RATE, 2003
35
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41. Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts, at http://www.fjc.gov/
history/home.nsf (last visited Mar. 8, 2005) (providing biographical information about federal judges who have served from 1789 through the present).
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While ideological distance (as measured by composition) and reversal rate are positively correlated (as we expected), the correlation
between the two variables is low: only 0.18 (perfect positive correlation, of course, would be 1).42 This result may be driven by the outlier
case of the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit has the largest difference between the percentage of Republican circuit and district appointees (34%), but one of the lowest reversal rates (8%). If we remove the Eighth Circuit, the correlation coefficient for the remaining
circuits increases to 0.47. Thus, a one unit increase in the difference
in court composition is associated with a .47 increase in the reversal
rate.
The attitudinal model, then, might explain the relative difference
in the Supreme Court's and courts of appeals' affirmance rates by focusing on their agenda-setting power. An appellate court with discretionary jurisdiction generally does not review cases with which it
agrees because the judges are satisfied with the lower court decision.
Thus, the court can focus on decisions with which it disagrees. An
appellate court with mandatory jurisdiction does not have that option and must review all cases.
State courts may offer richer data to test this hypothesis. Fortyone states have two levels of appellate courts. 43 There are many patterns of discretionary and mandatory appellate jurisdiction in those
states. 44 An empirical study of affirmance rates in those state courts
could control for the relative importance of agenda-setting power (as
well as other factors such as judicial selection method). We are unaware of any published scholarship that does so.
2. New Institutionalismand the Strategic Model
Increasingly, judicial scholars focus on institutional influences on
judicial decisions as part of a general movement in political science
termed "new institutionalism. '45 Strategic theories of judicial behavior adopt the attitudinal position that judges or justices seek to
achieve policy goals, but in order to attain their policy preferences,
they consider the preferences and likely actions of other relevant ac42. We calculated the linear association between the two variables using a simple correlation coefficient. We did not use the standardized coefficient (Pearson) because the two
variables share the same units of measurement.
43. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2003, at
7-59 (2004) (charting every state's judicial system), http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/
csp/2003_Files/2003_SCCS.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
44. See id.; NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A Taxonomy of Appellate Court Organization, in CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS: ExAMINING THE WORK OF THE STATE COURTS (1997).
45. See generally James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism:Organizational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734 (1984) (heralding a "return" in political science to a consideration of the role of institutional structures and features in political behavior generally).
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tors. 46

Leading proponents of this model, Forrest Maltzman, James
Spriggs, and Paul Wahlbeck, explain that "strategic" refers to the
fact that "justices' choices [are] shaped, at least in part, by the preferences and likely actions of other relevant actors. ' 47 Hence, strategic
theorists emphasize the influence of institutional factors, such as interactions with colleagues on the Court (internal dynamics) or reactions of other institutional actors, most notably Congress and the
President (exogenous constraints).
In order to understand why a judge votes to affirm (or reverse), a
strategic theorist would contend that we need to know more than the
ideological composition of the circuit and district courts. We also need
to understand the relevant institutional forces in order to model the
phenomenon. A strategic story would model a panel's decision to affirm as the product of individual judges' votes, which in turn are influenced by the other members of the panel and the circuit, the prior
and anticipated actions of lower court judges, and the possible reaction of the Supreme Court.
A circuit judge would consider the power of those above her in the
judicial hierarchy. For example, a panel's ruling is more likely to be
reheard en banc and to be reviewed by the Supreme Court if the
panel reverses the lower court (though the absolute probability remains low). Thus, an individual judge would consider that risk
(though chances are numerically small, the cost is high) when deciding whether to vote in favor of reversal. This works against reversal.
A circuit judge also would consider her power to control those below her in the judicial hierarchy. The appeals courts' only means of
disciplining district courts is reversal. Thus, it would seem necessary
to reverse with some frequency to deter shirking by district judges.
This works in favor of reversal. However, the district judges may be
constrained because (1) they aspire to promotion and thus are reverse-averse, (2) they share common views with the courts of appeals
(the attitudinal explanation), or (3) the costs of reversal in terms of
reputational loss and additional workload mean the predicted loss is
surprisingly high. Thus, a district judge's incentives, which are
known to circuit judges, may mitigate against the need for frequent
reversal.

46. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9-18 (1998)
(presenting the leading strategic account of the Supreme Court); WALTER F. MURPHY,
ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 31-36 (1964) (offering one of the first judicial theories
built on the collective nature of appellate courts).
47. See Forrest Maltzman et al., Strategy and Judicial Choice: New Institutionalist
Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING:
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 43, 47 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds.,
1999). See generally FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT:
THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000).
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A strategic explanation of the Supreme Court's very low affirmance
rate does not directly conflict with the attitudinal explanation, but it
does reveal a more complex process and also addresses one conundrum
of the attitudinal explanation. Since the Supreme Court is formally at
the apex of the judicial pyramid, the Court's decisions can be conceptualized as a principal directing (or attempting to direct) its agents:
the lower courts. 48 In this model, Supreme Court Justices, seeking to
advance their own policy preferences, will utilize certiorari review to
monitor the activities of the agents, namely courts of appeals judges
applying Supreme Court doctrine. If the Supreme Court uses certioshould
rari primarily as a means of controlling recalcitrant circuits, it 49
reverse most of the decisions that it reviews, and in fact, it does .
The foregoing explanation predicts the same outcome as the attitudinal model. Thus, it would be impossible to test empirically the relative explanatory value of each. However, the strategic account does
overcome one shortcoming in the sincere-rational-actor story. The attitudinal explanation ignores the fact that only four votes are required
to grant certiorari under the informal "Rule of Four."50 Thus, it would
seem possible that a four-Justice minority would disagree with a lower
court ruling and vote for review, but these Justices would ultimately
lose on the merits because they could not gain a fifth vote and the
lower court would be affirmed. If this is true, the Supreme Court's reversal rate would be lower when the Court is closely divided ideologically. The current Natural Court (1994-present) appears relatively
closely divided: It has decided more than twenty percent of its cases by
a one-vote margin. 51 But, its reversal rate has been essentially the
same as earlier courts. The reason is that a four-Justice minority will
be reticent to favor certiorari although it could do so alone. Justices
will behave strategically, refusing to vote for review of a decision if the
majority of the Court is likely to affirm, and thereby strengthen the
52
disfavored lower court position.

48. See Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent
Model of Supreme Court-CircuitCourt Interactions,38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 675 (1994). See
generally Matt Spitzer & Eric Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649 (2000)
(providing a framework for analyzing judicial monitoring of lower courts).
49. For a development and empirical test of this model, see Charles M. Cameron et
al., Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy:An Informational Model of the Supreme
Court's CertiorariDecisions, 94 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 101 (2000).
50. Certiorari requires the vote of only four out of nine Justices, as opposed to the majority vote required to decide a case. For an account of this informal rule of Supreme Court
practice, see DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 207-20 (6th ed. 2000).
51. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 224-25 tbl.3-4 (providing statistics for the 19942001 Terms); Goldstein, 2002 Term Statistics, supra note 2, at 3079 (reporting five-to-four
cases decided by the Supreme Court during the 2002 Term).
52. See Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 570-71 (1999).
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The strategic theory also can improve on the attitudinal account
of the high circuit affirmance rate by considering the relationships
within a circuit court and between a circuit and other courts. The
principal-agent construct reveals key features of the relationship between the panel and full court, situating the circuit court, as a whole,
as the principal that authorizes the panel as the agent to act on its
behalf. The circuit bench delegates the resolution of some cases to a
given panel. The panel has limited discretion to resolve the disputes
assigned to it. 5 3 The explicit limitation on the panel is circuit precedent in the form of published opinions, but implicit limitations, such
as respect for informal circuit norms, also exist. 54 When a circuit
learns that a panel has violated any shared expectation about appropriate behavior, the circuit will act to censor the panel.5 5 But it is difficult and costly for the circuit to monitor the panel's behavior because of information asymmetries; hence circuit judges will typically
rely on "signals"-warning signs-to alert them when a panel has
exceeded its authority. 56 The circuit's only formal mechanism of con57
trol is en banc review of the panel's decisions.
Circuit courts do not share the Supreme Court's prerogative to select cases for review. Thus, most appeals courts' decisions involve
routine examinations of lower court outcomes, primarily using highly
deferential standards of review, such as abuse of discretion or plain
error.5 8 Hence it appears to be a shared expectation of the courts of
53. Cf. PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT 132 (1992); GARY J. MILLER, MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS: THE POLITICAL

ECONOMY OF HIERARCHY 49-56 (1992) (explaining the principal's delegation of authority to
an agent by way of an incomplete contract which sets forth general, rather than detailed,
boundaries on the agent's authority).
54. See, e.g., J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS

191-92 (1981) (delineating the development and influence of informal norms and procedures of decisionmaking within circuit courts); cf. PETER F. NARDULLI, THE COURTROOM
ELITE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 66 (1978) (explaining how

collective efforts by courtroom elites (judges and lawyers) produce shared norms).
55. See Steven R. Van Winkle, Dissent as a Signal: Evidence from the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, at 3-4 (Aug. 29, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, delivered at the 1997 annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association) (on file with author).
56. See, e.g., Songer et al., supra note 48, at 674 (describing how "[d]ifficulty in monitoring," "asymmetric information," and "transactions costs" provide agents with the opportunity to reach decisions contrary to the principal's dictates); Van Winkle, supra note 55, at
4.
57. Van Winkle, supra note 55, at 3 (noting that "[e]n banc review ... is the only intra-circuit way to enforce the terms of the incomplete contract, ex post, when a violation is
suspected").
58. See, e.g., Maurice Rosenberg, Standards of Review, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE:
THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 30, 31
(Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) (explaining that in many instances "the court of appeals [is]
obliged by established standards to affirm unless, for example, crucial fact findings were
not merely in error but clearly so" and, likewise, that "[d]iscretionary rulings [have] to be
not merely incorrect, but abusive").
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appeals that decisions will affirm lower court rulings. Principal-agent
theory would hold that such a strong norm acts as an implicit limitation on the authority of panels. Hence, if a panel reverses a lower
court, that panel's decision would violate that limitation. It is relatively easy for nonpanelists to detect violations of the affirmation
norm and hence to decide whether to exact the sanction of en banc
review on panels that defect from the norm. One recent empirical
study found that the en banc court was much more likely to grant
certiorari to panels reversing lower courts, holding other factors constant.59 Thus the strategic theory predicts that low reversal rates become self-reinforcing: Current judges are hesitant to reverse because
prior judges did not reverse, and so on.
The circuit-district relationship can also be understood using the
principal-agent construct. The courts of appeals enunciate doctrine
that is effectuated by district courts. The circuits are not capable of
writing decisions sufficiently explicit and broad to allow for only one
outcome in a particular dispute. Thus, district judges may make decisions that conflict with those that the courts of appeals would otherwise have made. Circuit and district judges have their own preferences that reflect many factors, including policy goals, legal perspective, professional objectives, and personal desires. If those preferences are congruent, then a district judge will have no incentive to
depart from the circuit's preferences. If the preferences are divergent,
a judge has an incentive to make a noncomplying ruling.
The appeals courts' obvious mechanism of control over district
courts is reversal of their decisions. Likewise, a district judge's decision to make a ruling on her ideal point, rather than the circuit's, will
be affected by the availability of sanctions and the probability that
she will be caught. That is, a district judge will consider the probability of circuit reversal. Although the likelihood of reversal is relatively
small given the courts of appeals' recent practice, the cost of reversal
may be perceived as higher than a rational-actor model would dictate. For example, lower court judges who aspire to promotion to a
higher court know that their success will depend in part on an
evaluation of the number of times they have been reversed. The Federal Judicial Center estimates that between 40% and 60% of court of
60
appeals appointments in the last century were district judges. Because there are almost four times as many district judges as circuit
judges, the likelihood that any individual district judge would be promoted is relatively low-estimated by one study to be 6% during the

59. Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En
Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 267 (1999).
60. Daniel Kerman, Nonpromotion and Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
455, 460 (1999) (presenting data compiled by the Federal Judicial Center).
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1990s. 6 1 Yet, anecdotal evidence, as well as empirical studies of judi-

cial behavior, suggests that a far greater number of district judges
62
aspire to promotion to the courts of appeals.
B. Boundedly-Rational-ActorAccount
The political science accounts of appellate judging assume that
judges are rational actors who maximize their preferences when rendering decisions. 63 Whether seeking to comply with governing legal
principles, to further their ideological goals, or to increase their
chances of promotion, judges maximize.
These rational-actor accounts of judicial behavior assume that
judges, like other individuals, fully process all available information,
identify each available decision option, carefully calculate the costs
and benefits of each, and then select the one that maximizes their
preferences. 64 Research conducted by psychologists, behavioral
economists, and others over the past three decades calls the assumptions of rational-choice theory into question by demonstrating that
individuals often depart from its dictates in systematic and predictable ways. To use Herbert Simon's terminology, individuals are not
fully rational actors but instead are "boundedly rational" actors 65 who
often rely on "heuristics," or mental shortcuts, to make decisions that
'66
are "good enough.

There are two prominent approaches to bounded rationality:67 the
well-known "heuristics and biases" approach 68 (associated largely
61. Id. at 461.
62. Id. at 463 (observing that "[1]awyers are often heard to say that a particular ruling
reflects the fact that the judge is 'gunning for the circuit"' and that "[w]hile the average
probability of promotion is relatively low, particular judges may perceive it as higher"); see
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 111-12 (1995) (indicating that the structure of the
judicial compensation package discourages judges from seeking promotion outside the judiciary); Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional"About
the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 189 (1991) (indicating that judges
seek promotions to a higher bench).
63. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 29.
64. For an accessible introduction to rational-choice theory in the legal literature, see
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the RationalityAssumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060-66 (2000).
65. See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198-99 (1957). See generally HERBERT A.
SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 19-23 (1983).
66. See sources cited supra note 65.
67. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive
Toolbox, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 3, 26-27 (Gerd Gigerenzer et al.
eds., 1999) [hereinafter SIMPLE HEURISTICS] (observing the connection between the fastand-frugal program and the "adaptive decision maker" research developed by Payne,
Bettman, and Johnson).
68. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Heuristics] (introducing the heuristics-and-biases program). Many of the important early works are collected in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et
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with Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky) and the less familiar
"fast and frugal heuristics" approach 69 (associated with Gerd Gigerenzer and his collaborators). Although these two approaches differ
from one another, 70 their similarities are greater than their dissimilarities. Most significantly, proponents of both the heuristics-andbiases program and the fast-and-frugal-heuristics program contend
actors who use heuristics,
that human beings are boundedly rational
71
or mental shortcuts, to make decisions.
Judges, too, are human beings, and like other human beings,
judges surely employ heuristics in their own decisionmaking.7 2 Indeed,
recent studies of trialjudges have found evidence that heuristics influ73
ence decisionmaking on the trial bench; it seems likely that appellate

judges also use heuristics when making decisions on appeal.
Individuals are perhaps most likely to rely on heuristics when it is
taxing to use more deliberative decision processes due to cognitive
overload, limited time and attention, and so forth. Circuit court
judges, who have substantial caseloads and limited discretion over
al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY]. Many of the important recent works are collected in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter HEURISTICS AND BIASES].
69. See, e.g., BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (Gerd Gigerenzer &
Reinhard Selten eds., 1999) [hereinafter ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX]; SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra
note 67.
70. First, as noted in the text, the heuristics-and-biases theorists embrace rational
choice as a normative model, but the fast-and-frugal theorists do not. Second, and also
noted in the text, the heuristics-and-biases researchers tend to dwell on the maladaptive
properties of heuristics, while the fast-and-frugal theorists tend to focus on their adaptive
properties. Third, the theorists in each camp define and test heuristics in different ways.
The fast-and-frugal theorists develop what they call "computational models of heuristics"
rather than relying solely on the "vague labels" used by the heuristics-and-biases theorists.
Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 67, at 28. Gigerenzer and Todd define a "computational
model of a heuristic" as one that "specifies the precise steps of information gathering and
processing that are involved in generating a decision, such that the heuristic can be instantiated as a computer program." Id. at 16. Fourth, and relatedly, the heuristics-andbiases researchers focus solely on judgment and decisionmaking, see sources cited supra
note 68; the fast-and-frugal theorists focus not only on decision rules but also on rules for
searching and stopping search. Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 67, at 16-17.
71. Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 67, at 28 ("Our research program of studying fast
and frugal heuristics shares some basic features with the heuristics-and-biases program.
Both emphasize the important role that simple psychological heuristics play in human
thought, and both are concerned with finding the situations in which these heuristics are
employed.").
72. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize?
(The Same Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud
Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83 (2002) (arguing that judges use substantive law doctrinal rules
of thumb to simplify decisionmaking in securities cases); Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2003) (arguing that appellate judges and other lawmakers are boundedly rational); Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903
(2002) (exploring the use of judge-made heuristics in securities fraud cases).
73. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001)
(finding evidence that judicial decisionmaking is influenced by anchoring, framing, hindsight bias, representativeness, and egocentric bias).
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the cases they hear, are much more likely to find themselves in this
position than Supreme Court Justices, who hear very few cases.
Thus, we would expect the heuristics-based account we offer below to
shed more light on circuit judge decisionmaking than on Supreme
Court Justice decisionmaking.
1. Heuristics-and-BiasesProgram
The heuristics-and-biases program embraces rational choice as a
normative model of decisionmaking but rejects it as a positive model.
Relying largely on experimental evidence documenting departures
from rational choice, proponents of the heuristics-and-biases program
argue that individuals often use heuristics, rather than the complex
computations required by rational-choice theory, to make decisions.
Because heuristics-and-biases theorists believe individuals should
decide according to rational-choice theory but observe that they often
do not, they worry that heuristics can be maladaptive. They acknowledge that individuals often do well using heuristics, but they
are concerned that heuristics can lead individuals astray. Tversky
and Kahneman explain that individuals "rely on a limited number of
heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing
probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations.
In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead
7' 4
to severe and systematic errors.

The heuristics and biases theorists have identified a number of
heuristics that individuals use to make decisions. Initially, Tversky
and Kahneman focused their attention on three basic heuristics:
availability, representativeness, and anchoring.7 5 More recently,
Kahneman and his collaborator, Shane Frederick, have argued that
the three basic heuristics are availability, representativeness, and
the affect heuristic.7 6 Nonetheless, most decision researchers in this
tradition use the term heuristics-and-biasesloosely to include several

74. Tversky & Kahneman, Heuristics, supra note 68, at 1124. More recently, Kahneman and his collaborator, Shane Frederick, have explained heuristics as follows:
We will say that judgment is mediated by a heuristic when an individual assesses a specified target attribute of a judgment object by substituting another
property of that object-the heuristic attribute-which comes more readily to
mind....
Because the target attribute and the heuristic attribute are different, the
substitution of one for the other inevitably introduces systematic biases.
Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution
in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 68, at 49, 53.
75. See Tversky & Kahneman, Heuristics,supra note 68.
76. See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 74, at 56 ("It has become evident that an
affect heuristic should replace anchoring in the list of major general-purpose heuristics."
(citation omitted)).
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77
mental shortcuts that individuals have been shown to use. This is
also true in the legal literature, where scholars writing in the still78
'
emerging field of "behavioral law and economics" use the term heu9
ristics and biases to encapsulate a number of phenomena.
Two heuristics seem particularly likely to illuminate the affirmance effect in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: the status quo bias and
the omission bias.

(a) Status Quo Bias
The first is the so-called "status quo bias." All other things being
equal, individuals tend to prefer an option that is consistent with the
status quo rather than one that requires a change from the status
quo. 80 The literature includes ample illustrations of status quo bias.
Researchers have found, for instance, that consumers given a choice
between a highly reliable but more expensive utility (like electric
service) and a less reliable but less expensive utility tend to choose
whichever is the status quo option. 81 Likewise, when choosing among

83
auto insurance plans, 82 health insurance plans, investment portfolios, 84 or contract terms,8 5 most people select the option representing

the status quo. Researchers have even used the status quo bias to
explain the incumbency effect in American electoral politics. According to Tversky and George Quattrone, "Because it is natural to take
the incumbent's policy as the status quo-the reference point to
which the challenger's policy is compared-and because losses loom
larger than gains, it follows that the incumbent enjoys a distinct advantage.16 In short, "preferences are shaped, in part, by superficial
77. See, e.g., HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 68 (containing articles identifying
and describing the operation of several different phenomena under the rubric of "heuristics
and biases"); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 68 (same).
78. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (proposing behavioral law and economics as a field).
79. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism,
97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165, 1170-73 (2003) (observing that legal scholars have focused primarily on the following five heuristics and biases: representativeness, availability, hindsight
bias, anchoring, and self-serving bias).
80. See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
81. See Raymond S. Hartman et al., Consumer Rationality and the Status Quo, 106
Q.J. ECON. 141, 158-60 (1991).
82. See Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 288, 294 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
83. Id.
84. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 79, at 12-19.
85. See Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preferencein Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1586 (1998); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608,
611 (1998).
86. George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psychological
Analyses of Political Choice, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 719, 725-26 (1988).
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features of the task," including "which option is labeled 'status
quo."'87

With respect to judges, scholars have used the status quo bias to
explain stare decisis. As Robert Prentice and Jonathan Koehler put
it, "American judges adhere to stare decisis because it is an inheritance from English tradition and therefore represents the status
quo." 88 Moreover, "Judges will often accept the current state, which is
represented by precedent, because to do otherwise would require significant cognitive effort. 8 9 And, as Oona Hathaway observed, "By relying on past decisions, judges can save significant time and effort
and thereby consider far more cases than would otherwise be possible. Judges can turn to past analyses and avoid rethinking every aspect of a decision." 90
Likewise, each case on appeal comes with a status quo position:
one party has won a judgment below. All other things being equal,
appellate judges may prefer not to disturb the status quo position because the costs of doing so may appear to outweigh the benefits for
two reasons. First, changing the status quo by reversing the lower
court decision requires the appellate judge to impose a "loss" on a
previously victorious litigant; although this means that a losing
party below will incur a corresponding "gain," psychological evidence
demonstrates that losses are much more aversive than corresponding
gains are attractive.9 1 Judges are likely to know this intuitively and
perhaps even to feel the loss themselves. There is evidence, for example, that judges are susceptible to "loss framing" when supervising
litigants in settlement conferences; 92 there is no obvious reason why
appellate judges would not be susceptible to the same phenomenon.
Second, and more simply, altering the status quo by reversing the
lower court decision requires the appellate judge to expend time, attention, and effort on the case that she would not otherwise have to
expend. In other words, the path of least resistance is to "turn to

87. Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision
Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 598 (2003) (footnote omitted).
88. Id. at 638.
89. Id. at 639.
90. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Patternof Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 626 (2001).
91. Cf. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979) ("The aggravation that one experiences in
losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the
same amount."). Research suggests that losses loom at least twice as large as equivalent
gains. See Chip Heath et al., Goals as Reference Points, 38 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 79, 87
(1999) ("Studies of risky choice and riskless choice have presented converging evidence
that losses are weighted approximately two times more than equivalent gains ... (citations omitted)).
92. See Guthrie et al., supra note 73, at 794-97.
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[the] past analys[is] and avoid rethinking every aspect of [the] decision."93
The status quo bias may play an even more prominent role on
courts of appeals due to the phenomenon of "accountability." Phil
Tetlock and Richard Boettger have demonstrated in experimental
studies that individuals who know they will be held accountable for
their decisions are more likely to adhere to the status quo than are
94
those who do not expect to be held accountable. Because individual
judges are accountable to the litigants whose fates they determine
(as well as to their copanelists, the circuit as a whole, and even the
Supreme Court), the status quo bias may have an even greater influence on them.
(b)

Omission Bias

Closely related to the status quo bias is the so-called "omission
bias." Individuals tend to react more strongly to a result that is the
95
product of an apparent "action" rather than an apparent "inaction.
Moreover, an individual "is perceived to be more responsible for out96
comes of commissions than for outcomes of omissions" and also to
experience more regret as a consequence of an action rather than an
omission. Consider the following example tested by Kahneman and
Tversky:
Paul owns shares in Company A. During the past year he considered switching to stock in Company B, but he decided against it.
He now finds that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he
had switched to the stock of Company B. George owned shares in
Company B.During the past year he switched to stock in Company
if he
A. He now finds that he would have been better off by $1,200
97
had kept his stock in Company B. Who feels more regret?
George and Paul obtained the same outcome, but most study participants indicated that George would experience more regret than
93. Hathaway, supra note 90, at 626; see also Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power
in the State (and Federal)Courts, 2000 SuP. CT. REV. 357, 391 ("Judges, like other people,
become habituated to and invested in the tasks, activities, and procedures they customarily and repetitively perform. They overestimate the disruption that would arise from
switching to new tasks or activities." (footnote omitted)).
94. Philip E. Tetlock & Richard Boettger, Accountability Amplifies the Status Quo Effect when Change Creates Victims, 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (1994).
95. See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 400-01 (3d ed. 2000); see also

Marcel Zeelenberg et al., Attributions of Responsibility and Affective Reactions to Decision
Outcomes, 104 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 303, 304 (2000) ("Outcomes achieved through action
generally lead to more intense affective reactions than the same outcomes achieved
through inaction." (citations omitted)).
96. Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambiguity, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263, 275 (1990).
97. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, 246 SCI. AM.
160, 173 (1982).
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Paul.9 8 George, not Paul, acted, and actions that turn out poorly induce more negative affect than inactions that turn out poorly.99
The omission bias thus induces people not to act, to just 'leave
things as they are." In the courts of appeals, judges have essentially
two choices: they can leave the lower court opinion undisturbed,
which is akin to an omission, or they can disturb the lower court
opinion by reversing (or reversing and remanding, reversing in part,
and so on), which is akin to a commission. Given the omission bias
(in conjunction with the status quo bias), it seems reasonable to predict that judges would favor affirmances over reversals. In so doing,
they protect themselves psychologically because any negative outcome resulting from the decision is a product of the trial judge's action, not the appellate judge's inaction. Moreover, the law generally
favors omissions over commissions. As Prentice and Koehler put it,
"The law favors inaction over action and the usual over the unusual.
Existing principles are presumed to be appropriate and are relatively
unscrutinized. Old laws that would never receive support if offered
anew go unchallenged. When suggestions for change do emerge, they
are received skeptically."'10 0
2. Fast-and-Frugal-Heuristics
Program
The fast-and-frugal-heuristics program departs in an even more
dramatic way from rational-choice theory. In contrast to the heuristics-and-biases program, which rejects rational-choice theory only on
positive grounds, the fast-and-frugal program rejects rational-choice
theory as both a positive and normative account of decisionmaking.
From a normative perspective, the proponents of the fast-andfrugal-heuristics program argue that a decision strategy should be
assessed on the basis of its success or failure in real-world environments, not according to whether it complies with the logical and
mathematical rules of rational-choice theory.' 0 As Gigerenzer and
his colleague Peter Todd explain:
There are no optimal strategies in many real-world environments
in the first place. This does not mean, though, that there are no
performance criteria in the real world. As a measure of the success
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Prentice & Koehler, supra note 87, at 589-90 (footnotes omitted).
101. See Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 67, at 28 ('CThe [fast-and-frugal approach] dispenses with the focus on coherence criteria (e.g., the laws of probability) as the yardsticks
of rationality. Instead, we study the correspondence-based performance of heuristics in
real-world environments, situations where optimal coherent strategies are often not known
or not feasible."); Gary Klein, The Fiction of Optimization, in ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX, supra
note 69, at 103, 104 (arguing that "optimization cannot and should not be a gold standard
for decision making').
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of a heuristic, we compare its performance with the actual requirements of its environment, which can include making accurate
decisions, in a minimal amount of time, and using a minimal
amount of information. We have thus replaced the multiple coherence criteria stemming from the laws of logic and probability with
multiple correspondence criteria relating to real-world decision

performance. 102
From a positive perspective, the fast-and-frugal-heuristics theorists reject rational-choice theory on the grounds that it paints an
unrealistic picture of how individuals actually make decisions, viewing "the mind as if it were a supernatural being possessing demonic
powers of reason, boundless knowledge, and all of eternity with
which to make decisions.' ' 0 3 They propose, instead, a more "psychologically plausible"'0 4 approach to decisionmaking:
The goal of the program is to understand how actual humans .
make decisions, as opposed to heavenly beings equipped with practically unlimited time, knowledge, memory, and other infinite resources. The challenge is to base models of bounded rationality on
social, and behavioral repertoire that a
the cognitive, emotional,
05
species actually has.
In short, the fast-and-frugal-heuristics theorists claim not only
that individuals do use heuristics when making decisions but also
that they should use heuristics because they will obtain good outcomes in a fast and frugal manner. As Gigerenzer and Todd put it,
"whereas the heuristics-and-biases program portrays heuristics as a
frequent hindrance to sound reasoning, rendering Homo sapiens not
so sapient, we see fast and frugal heuristics as enabling us to make
reasonable decisions and behave adaptively in our environment'0 6
Homo sapiens would be lost without them.'
The fast-and-frugal-heuristics theorists have identified several
heuristics that individuals use in real-world environments, including
"ignorance-based" heuristics, 0 7 "one-reason" heuristics, 0 8 and heuristics that reflect social and cultural forces. 0 9
102. Gigerenzer & Todd, supranote 67, at 22.
103. Id. at 5.
104. Gerd Gigerenzer, The Adaptive Toolbox, in ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX, supra note 69, at
37, 38.
105. Id.
106. Gigerenzer & Todd, supranote 67, at 29.
107. See generally Daniel G. Goldstein & Gerd Gigerenzer, The Recognition Heuristic:
How Ignorance Makes Us Smart, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 67, at 37; Bernhard
Borges et al., Can Ignorance Beat the Stock Market?, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 67,
at 59.

108. See generally Jean Czerlinski et al., How Good Are Simple Heuristics?, in SIMPLE
HEURISTICS, supra note 67, at 97; Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein, Betting on One
Good Reason: The Take The Best Heuristic, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 67, at 75;
Laura Martignon & Ulrich Hoffrage, Why Does One-Reason Decision Making Work? A Case
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(a) Recognition Heuristic
The "recognition heuristic" 110 is an example of an "ignorancebased""' heuristic. Applicable only when an individual is attempting
to select one of two (or more) options and recognizes only one of those
options, 1 12 the recognition heuristic posits that "[i]f one of two objects
is recognized and the other is not, [the individual should] infer that
the recognized object has the higher value."" 3 For example, researchers asked students from Germany and the United States to indicate
which city-San Diego or San Antonio-has a larger population.
Surprisingly, 100% of the German students but only 62% of the
American students correctly chose San Diego. Why? "All of the German students had heard of San Diego, but many of them did not recognize San Antonio. They were thus able to apply the recognition
heuristic and make a correct inference. The American students, recognizing both cities, were not ignorant enough to be able to apply the
recognition heuristic.""14 Ignorance-based heuristics, like the recogni-

tion heuristic, are unlikely to shed much light on the affirmance effect because judges, too, are unlikely to be "ignorant enough" about
the matters in front of them to employ these ignorance-based heuristics successfully. However, the recognition heuristic might help explain the so-called "repeat player" effect in court, according to which
those entities who appear frequently in court-governments, corporations, insurance companies, and so forth-tend to fare better than
those "one-shotters" who appear only once." 5 That is, judges might
Study in Ecological Rationality, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 67, at 119; Laura Martignon & Kathryn Blackmond Laskey, Bayesian Benchmarks for Fast and Frugal Heuristics, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 67, at 169; and Jorg Rieskamp & Ulrich Hoffrage,
When Do People Use Simple Heuristics, and How Can We Tell?, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 67, at 141.
109. See generally ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX, supra note 69.
110. See generally Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 67.
111. See Goldstein & Gigerenzer, supra note 107, at 57.
112. Id. at 41.
113. Id. (emphasis omitted).
114. Id. at 43. Likewise, in another study, researchers asked German and American
subjects to make hypothetical stock purchase decisions. See Borges et al., supra note 107,
at 59. Those who followed the recognition heuristic-that is, those who invested in companies whose names they recognized-built portfolios that performed better than others over
a six-month period (though this was during a bull market, when one might expect this
strategy to perform disproportionally well). See id. at 71.
The impressive performance of recognition-based portfolios was obtained in a
strong bull market. We do not yet know how well these results would generalize to other periods, such as a decreasing bear market. One explanation for the
recognition heuristic's good performance is that it is picking "big" firms, which
are known to do well in up markets.

Id.
115. See generally Stanton Wheeler et al., Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning
and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21 LAW & Soc'y REV. 403 (1987); Marc
Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9
LAw & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974).
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make note of the parties (or their counsel) and tend to rule favorably
for those whom they have encountered previously. Because those
they have encountered previously are likely to fall into the repeatplayer category, repeat players might fare better due to this recognition heuristic.
(b)

One-Reason Heuristics

The so-called "one-reason" heuristics are only slightly more complicated than the "ignorance-based" heuristics. According to the onereason heuristics, individuals choose between options based on one
salient dimension. 116 Two one-reason heuristics might contribute to
the affirmance effect: the "take the first" heuristic and the "take the
last" heuristic. Using the take-the-first heuristic"'17-a heuristic that
5
is most appropriate for expert decisionmakers like judges" 8individuals simply adopt the first course of action that comes to
mind." 9 Thus, a judge may simply affirm a case in front of her because that is the decision strategy most likely to occur to her first.
The take-the-last heuristic is similar, though it is potentially appropriate for both expert and nonexpert decisionmakers. Using the takethe-last heuristic,110 individuals simply use the same decision cue
they used before to make the decision. Thus, if an appellate judge
voted to affirm in a similar prior case, she might simply opt to do the
same thing this time around. Neither of these heuristics can account
for why judges initially decided to affirm because both assume some
recollection of prior decision strategies-take-the-last does so explic116. Gigerenzer, supra note 104, at 45 (observing that one-reason heuristics "rely only
on one cue to make the decision and ignore all others").
117. See generally Daniel G. Goldstein et al., Group Report: Why and When Do Simple
Heuristics Work?, in ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX, supra note 69, at 173.
118. Id. at 177.
Take The First is argued to be effective because, for an expert, part of recognizing or categorizing a situation as typical is to recall what to do in that situation.
Options generated are not random but may come to mind in order of quality.
Take The First is less successful in domains where the decision maker is not an
expert or in completely novel situations within a domain of expertise.
Id.
119. Id.
[W]hen faced with a problem to solve, often the best course of action to take is
the first (or only) one that comes to mind. The strategy of evaluating solutions
as they come to mind, and stopping with the first one that satisfies an aspiration level, is called Take The First.
Id.
120. Gigerenzer & Goldstein, supranote 108, at 80.
[Take-The-Last] uses a heuristic principle for search that draws on a strategy
known as an Einstellung set. Karl Duncker and other Gestalt psychologists
demonstrated that when people work on a series of problems, they tend to start
with the strategy that worked on the last problem when faced with a new, similar-looking problem ....
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itly and take-the-first does so implicitly because the first thought
that occurs to a decisionmaker will often be based on expertise arising from prior experience-but both the take-the-first heuristic and
the take-the-last heuristic might help explain the perpetuation of the
affirmance effect.
(c) Imitation
Finally, some heuristics are a product of social and cultural factors. As Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten explain, "Social norms can
be seen as fast and frugal behavioral mechanisms that dispense with
individual cost-benefit computations and decision making. ' 121 This
means that "[a]daptive solutions can be found with little knowledge;
the price for this is that they are not general, but do work in a spe1 22
cific environment, culture, or time.'

One such heuristic is the "imitation heuristic,"'123 which is "a fast
and frugal strategy that saves an organism from having to extract information from the environment anew, or from calculating from
scratch.' '

24

This heuristic "allow[s] individuals to save the costs of in-

dividual learning, experimentation, and search by exploiting the information available in the minds of other individuals."' 125 Following
such imitation strategies "as 'eat what older and experienced conspecifics eat' or 'prefer mates picked by others' can speed up decision
making by reducing the need for direct experience and information
gathering.'

1

26

Using the imitation heuristic, an appellate judge would simply
make the same decision that relevant others have made. The judge
might defer to what most others confronted with the same decision
have decided127-for example, the district judge below, other circuits,
or other colleagues on the panel-or she might defer to those whom
she deems to have greater status than her 12--for example, other
judges in her circuit or in other circuits who have faced the same essential decision. Whether imitating the district judge below or other

121. Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten, Rethinking Rationality, in ADAPTIVE
TOOLBOX, supra note 69, at 1, 10.
122. Id.
123. See generally Joseph Henrich et al., Group Report: What Is the Role of Culture in
Bounded Rationality?, in ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX, supra note 69, at 343.
124. Daniel Goldstein et al., supra note 117, at 174.
125. Henrich et al., supra note 123, at 343.
126. Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 67, at 31.
127. See generally Gigerenzer & Selten, supra note 121, at 9-10; Gigerenzer & Todd,
supra note 67, at 31-33; Goldstein et al., supra note 117, at 175-75; Henrich et al., supra
note 123, at 343-45.
128. See generally Gigerenzer & Selten, supra note 121, at 9-10; Gigerenzer & Todd,
supra note 67, at 31-33; Goldstein et al., supra note 117, 174-75; Henrich et al., supra note
123, at 343-45.
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circuit judges, an appellate judge who decides per the imitation heuristic is likely to affirm the decision in front of her because that is
consistent with what the trial judge decided below and what her colleagues on the appellate bench, particularly those who share her
129
ideological preferences, are likely to do.
IV.

CONCLUSION

We have attempted in this Article to examine the affirmance effect on the U.S. Courts of Appeals through the lens of political science, psychology, and behavioral economics. Are these disciplines
necessary to this inquiry? The affirmance effect may simply be the
product of two phenomena: the "deference norm" on the courts of appeals and the tendency of experts to agree with one another about
three-quarters of the time. 130 These factors are undoubtedly relevant
to understanding the affirmance effect, but we believe our analyses
of individual decisionmaking and institutional behavior also shed
light on why circuit court judges so frequently "just say no" to appellants.

129. The "bounded rationality" explanation we have developed in this Article takes as
its unit of analysis the individual judge. We recognize, of course, that circuit judges decide
in panels of three, so a more extensive analysis would also take into account the literature
on group decisionmaking.
130. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial:
Defendants'Advantage,3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 125, 131 (2001).

